How and why do agglomerations emerge? While economic historians emphasize trade and economic geographers emphasize variety, we still don't understand the role of coordination. I fill this gap by extending the model of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) to formalize Smith's (1776) theory of agglomeration. I then test the model in a laboratory experiment and find individuals tend to coalesce purely to coordinate exchange, with more agglomeration when there is a larger variety of goods in the economy. I also find that tying individuals to the land reduces agglomeration, but magnifies the effect of variety.
Introduction
Cities and marketplaces are central to economic development, but our understanding of how they form and what functions they perform is still very partial. 1 While many scholars of early cities emphasize trade, and even describe populations concentrating at marketplaces (Hodder 1965; Kheirabadi 1991; Romano 2015) , it is difficult to empirically establish that trade is the cause of early agglomerations. 2 On the other hand, agglomeration scholars using evidence from satellite pixels are divided on the importance of trade: Henderson et al. (2018) argues agriculture is the fundamental force, while Desmet, Nagy, and Rossi-Hansberg (2018) argue for an important interaction between trade with migration. Since we lack identification of the micro-mechanisms (Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon 2011; Gibbons and Overman 2012) , I use the experimental method to generate agglomerations from individual choices. This approach complements both the historical and satellite approaches by isolating specific factors in the entangled and non-linear processes of regional development. But to test the mechanisms in the lab, I first modify the standard model of agglomeration.
I develop a pure-exchange location-coordination game based on historical narratives and Smith's (1776) theory of agglomeration. Specifically, I extend the model of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) and Anderson, Ellison, and Fudenberg (2010) to multiple goods and multiple locations. This model allows me to focus on the gains from trading new goods (emphasized by Christaller 1933; Boulding 1964; Romer 1994 ). It does so by seperating preference parameters from the fixed costs of production, which Neary (2001) argued are confounded in the standard model. The model also allows me to seperate land-tied effects, noted by Smith (1776) and Krugman (1991) 1 am thus able to isolate the independant and interacting effects of variety and land-tied. 3 Although there is a huge strategy space and multiple equilibria, the model predicts that marketplaces emerge as a resilient solution to a highly complex problem of coordinating a multi-coincidence of wants and locations. Agglomerations emerge through individuals' desires to spatially coordinate exchange, and a central force in their formation is the variety of goods obtained from exchange.
I test the implications from my trade and location coordination game with a laboratory experiment.
The experiment builds on Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2008) and Kimbrough and Wilson (2011) to generate multiple realizations of the entire development process with clear counterfactuals and weak econometric assumptions. Specifically, I initially distribute individuals evenly over a featureless rectangular grid (resembling a petri dish) and then observe how the geographic distribution of individuals evolves from period to period as individuals change locations to trade an endowment. I then analyze agglomeration/non-agglomeration outcomes in a way comparable to a typical regression analysis of satellite pixels.
The results show that geographically dispersed traders spontaneously coalesce to reap the gains from trade. A marketplace emerges as a geographic coordinate in both senses of the word, a physical point on a map and a focal point coordinating traders. This outcome is not theoretically ideal (as often emphasized), but marketplaces persistently solve the coordination problem of traders to improve welfare overall. Further results test the variety and land-tied mechanisms by exogenously varying the number of different goods in the economy and whether traders are land-tied or not. These results show there is more agglomeration in economies with a larger variety of goods, that being land-tied reduces agglomeration, but that being land-tied magnifies the effect of variety. Finally, I show the sum of individual location choices to trade leads to a Zipf population distribution, providing a consistent explanation for both the historical narrative and the macro statistics. As a whole, these experiments reinforce Smith's narrative of agglomeration and furthers our understanding about the mechanisms.
Theory
Building on Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) , I examine a two-stage location coordination game where individuals make location choices in the first stage choice based on the benefits from trade in the second 3 There is a vast literature that builds on the model developed by Krugman (1991) , with origins in Marshall (1920) , on the emergence of cities based on the location of production (Krugman 1996; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 2001; Tabuchi and Thisse 2011; Fujita and Thisse 2013a; De Palma and Papageorgiou 2017 I focus on a specific version of this game that isolates the agglomeration phenomena while still retaining some abstract generality. Individuals are evenly dispersed over a featureless two dimensional grid, resembling the setup of Christaller (1933) . Individuals have Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences to create the following four points of intuition. 1) If I bring more of a good then my payoffs will be higher. 2) If others bring more of the same good as me then my payoffs will be lower. 3) If others bring a larger variety of different goods then my payoff will be higher. 4) The exact magnitude of these relations depends on the complementarity of the goods, i.e. there is no gain in agglomerating to obtain perfect substitutes. 4 I first solve for the second stage consumption payoffs after good and location decisions have been made, and then endogenize the decisions of where to bring which goods.
Stage 2, Pure Exchange
Each individual i maximizes an identical (CES) utility function subject to a budget constraint M i to obtain a stage 2 payoff of U 2 i . Let X i,g denote the quantity of good g consumed by i, n denote the number of goods, and ρ ∈ (0, 1] be the substitute/complements parameter. Where
yields individual consumption and payoffs
Considering a pure-endowment economy, denote an individuals endowment as Ω g , the numeraire price 4 Two dimensions were chosen rather than one because one dimensional models often have results that do not generalize (see Irmen and Thisse 1998 for example) . CES preferences illustrate the importance of complementary goods, but do magnify the effect because all goods are complementary by an equal degree.
3 as P g , and the total endowment of a good as Ω g . Then the competitive-equilibrium conditions Ω g = ∑ i X * i,g imply the price ratio for goods g and g is P g /P g 1 ρ−1
= Ω g /Ω g . Substituting the endowmentvalue based incomes, M i = P g Ω g , and the equilibrium price ratios into the payoff function yields
Stage 1, Coordinating Who brings What Where
Each individual i is has a home location i on a grid S = {(x 1 , y 1 ), ..., (x L , y L )}. They choose to bring an endowment Ω i ∈ {Ω 1 , ..., Ω n } to a location i ∈ S to earn payoffs according to equation 2. But individuals lose part of their endowment when they move; i.e person i has a transportation cost c( i , i ) to move from his current location i to location i . Since all endowments that are lost in getting to affect the equilibrium exchange rates, equation 2 refers to endowments net-of-transportation costs. Formally, consider all individuals who chose to bring Ω g to i and denote Ω g ( i ) as the sum of endowments and c g ( i ) as the sum amount lost. The utility achieved by individual i in this first stage, U 1 i , from choosing to bring Ω i to i is
Equation 3 shows each individual's payoffs are highly contingent on everyone's locations, costs, endowments, and preferences. But too many computations are required to explore the paremeter space because n goods, L locations, and I individuals creates Σ = (n × L) I different combinations to evaluate in finding the pure-strategy equilibria for a given parameter combination. So to make progress I focus on one specific game: the smallest number of goods that allow for comparative statics on variety and the maximum number of individuals and locations that were computationally feasible to analyze.
There are I = 6 individuals with identical CES(ρ = .5) utility functions on a 5 × 3 grid of locations.
There is a 2 unit Manhattan distance cost for moving from home to destination locations -i.e. c ( i , i ) =
Each individual is endowed with 12 units of whatever good they choose and they can move to any location on the grid. While analyzing macrostates instead of microstates discards information, it could potentially simplify the analysis a great deal. Denote Γ as the number of microstates per macrostate, recall Σ is the number of potential states, and denote #EQ as the number of equilibria. Table 1 shows a summary of the game. (Crawford and Haller 1990; Crawford 1991; Ellison 2000) that shows how equilibria are selected based on notions of stability. In particular, I show how "resilient" central marketplaces are.
I say a central marketplace is resilient if no individual wants to deviate from that equilibrium under the belief that all of other players are deviating with large probability. These beliefs about deviations can be real (when other players use a mixed strategy) or imaginary (when others are simply assumed to have a trembling hand). The important point is that when an individual believes others make choices stochastically, some equilibria will be eliminated due to the lower expected payoffs that stem from the risk of miscoordination.
I show how resilient each equilibrium is by numerically computing expected utilities for different deviation magnitudes and eliminate equilibria from the pool when any individual is no-longer best responding.
Formally, the expected utility for an individual i is
where (σ Ω,−i ,σ ,−i ) are vectors that specify the probability of individual −i choosing the equilibrium
(Ω −i , −i ), and (ε Ω,−i , ε ,−i ) are vectors that specify the probability of deviating from equilibrium. 5 In my computations, I scale the deviations from equilibrium to be in percentage terms. Specifically, for L locations, there is 1 − e(L − 1)/L probability of choosing the equilibrium location and e/L probability of choosing each other location. Likewise, for n goods, there is 1 − e(n − 1)/n probability of choosing the equilibrium endowment and e/n probability of choosing each other endowment. Therefore the single parameter e ∈ [0, 1] is used to calculate the degree of strategic resilience, where e = 0 specifies the pure strategy equilibrium and e = 1 specifies all actions are choosen with equal probability. While it is an empirical question as to whether a central marketplace will emerge, more strategic resilient equilibria are more likely to to remain selected. Building on the literature on focal-points (Schelling 2006; Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden 1994; Kramarz 1996; Isoni et al. 2013) , particularly the formal definition of dynamic focal points by Casajus (2001) , central marketplaces are equilibria that are more likely to arise through the history of play and frame any stage-game currently being played. That historical frame should create a tendency towards agglomerating at the same locations, even after being physically reset. This prediction is noteworthy because cities are resilient, being well documented by Davis and Weinstein (2002) for example, but 'memory' is not predicted by the standard model (Martin and Sunley 2012) . 6 Thus the first hypothesis generated from this coordination game is Hypothesis 1: Once a central marketplace has been historically selected, it will re-emerge after shocks. 6 Resilience is different than persistence, which is also predicted by model and much of the literature (i.e. Litina 2016;
Allen and Donaldson 2018). Resilience results because coordinated agglomerations are stable for reasons that are assumed away in competitive agglomerations -i.e. individuals not being indifferent across space (Glaeser 2007) or having exogenously fixed locations (Hotelling 1929 
The Effect of New Goods
While the last section showed central marketplaces are robust to a wide range of individual deviations, this section focuses on how steep the incentives are to approach that equilibrium. Despite the greater number of alternative equilibria that result from increased variety (shown in Table 1 ) the gains from trade at a central marketplace also grows. 7 Specifically, for a given cost to travel to the marketplace, the benefits of going to the marketplace are larger because More New Goods ⇒ More Gains from Trade ⇒ More Benefits to Agglomerating.
The intuition for this argument is found by comparing an individuals' utility alone (where individuals consume their entire endowment) to an individuals utility at the central agglomeration (where individuals trade for smaller amounts of more different goods). While the CES case is shown in Appendix Section 5.2, the following illustration makes the point generally. Assume individuals always trade for an equal amount of the other goods available. In a world with 3 goods, the incentive to agglomerate is
In a world with 2 goods, the incentive to agglomerate is
and the change in the agglomeration incentive is
The incentive to agglomerate is ∆U/∆n because when there are more new goods to be traded, there are more gains at a central marketplace. The CES complements parameter is important because when the goods are more complementary the locations are more strategic-complementary and the extensivemarginal utility is larger. But for a large set of unobservable preferences, the incentive to agglomerate is determined by an observable number of new goods that can be obtained at a central marketplace. Thus the theory predicts Hypothesis 2: A larger variety of goods in the economy will lead to more agglomeration 7 This is also the reason why the central marketplace equilibrium more resiliant compared to other macrostates. 8
Individuals Not Land-Tied
In the current setup, individuals have home locations that are tied to a particular spot, and must choose where to locate and what to bring for trade. While this is a feature of many rural and agricultural communities, many people are not farmers tied to the land. And since the predictions are derived based on the gains from trade, Hypothesis 2 seems plausibly general for settings other than the current environment specified -even when individuals are not land-tied. But being land tied could also have it's own direct effect, reducing the cost of agglomerating. Morever, holding payoffs at a central marketplace constant, it could still be easier to discover and more resilient to deviations in the choices of home-locations. But since the strategy space grows too large to compute additional choices, the following hypotheses are stated without strong theoretical support.
Hypothesis 2 (Strong Form): A larger variety of goods in the economy will lead to more agglomeration, even when individuals are not land-tied
Hypothesis 3: Not being land-tied will lead to more agglomeration.
Since there are multiple equilibria, which equilibrium strategies individuals actually choose is an empirical question. This means the theory is not entirely deterministic and the hypotheses are only probabilistic claims about a small set of equilibria being selected. I use the laboratory evaluate which equilibria are selected and how they match the theoretical hypotheses.
Empirics 3.1 Experimental Setup
I recruit experimental participants to repeatedly play the game described in the theory section. There were 6 participants in an experiment session, with each participant assigned an initial location and 12 units of a particular good as shown in Figure 1 . Participants only make choices for the first stage of the game, with the computer automatically computing the second stage equilibrium based on choices in the first stage. Specifically, at the start of a period, each individual chooses one location and one good to bring and then a Walrasian equilibrium is computed based on the number and variety of goods brought to that location. Each participants makes these choices for 32 periods, with each period lasting 1 minute, having their endowments reset before they begin the next period.
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The experimental sessions were conducted two at a time (one session starting with 2 goods, and one with 3 goods) within the same room. After half of the periods have completed, the locations are reset and the number of goods changes, either increasing from 2 → 3 or decreasing from 3 → 2 depending on the initial treatment in the session. This means there is within session variation in "butcher, brewer"
vs. "butcher, brewer, baker" agglomerations. I also vary whether individuals' home locations are land tied at the block level. Specifically, the first six parallel sessions treated home locations as not land-tied t+1 = t , while the next six parallel sessions treated homes as land-tied, t+1 = 0 . The entire design is shown in Table 2 ; there are two blocks (land-tied, not), each with six sessions where the number of goods going from 2 → 3 and six sessions going from 3 → 2, and each session having six individuals. 
Data Summary
The results of the experiment are summarized in Figure 3 t. The first regression also includes session fixed effects, while the second includes time fixed effects as well as covariates. Table 3 shows the results of those regressions, which is followed by discussion. The first column looks within sessions over time periods, and shows a positive coefficient for 'Three Goods'. This means that a population becomes more spatially concentrated when that economy has more variety and thus supports Hypothesis 2. The second column looks across sessions within a time period and shows the coefficient for 'Three Goods' remains positive before and after adding the interaction term from 'Three Goods x Not Land-Tied'. This means that economies with more variety are more concentrated regardless of whether they are land-tied, and thus supports the strong version of Hypothesis 2. 9 The second column also shows a positive coefficient for 'Not Land Tied' which means economies that are not land-tied have more concentrated populations, supporting Hypothesis 3. A negative interaction 9 Furthermore, running a seperate regression (within-period across-session) for 'Land-Tied' and 'Three Goods' variables show that the R 2 for the agricultural variable 'Land-Tied' is larger than the R 2 for the trade variable 'Three Goods'. This resembles the results of Henderson et al. (2018) who finds a smaller R 2 for OLS regresssions with trade variables compared to agriculture variables in predicting the brightness of pixels. While they conclude "agricultural fundamentals drove the location of economic activity", my results suggest that R 2 results are also consistent with a non-dichotomous explanation, such as one by Bairoch (1988) who argued agriculture affects trade in fostering urbanization. However, this finding is only suggestive effect is also shown, and this means the effect of variety is smaller in economies that are not land-tied.
While the standard errors are larger for the interaction effect, a visual inspection of population per populated cell (Panel A, Figure 3 ) also supports this relationship and further suggests that being land-tied impedes the initial formation of central marketplaces in economies with fewer goods. As a whole, these data support the following findings Table 3 follows much of the empirical work by using an aggregate index or level, I also exploit the non aggregated data to measure agglomeration as a dynamic spatial process. Specifically, I estimate a diffusion coefficient in Appendix Section 5.4. These results provide a complementary interpretation of Findings 2 and 3; sessions with that were land-tied or had 2 goods were more diffusive than sessions had 3 goods or were not land-tied.
Zipf Distributed Aggregates
Economic geographers have long been fascinated by the linear relationship between the log(size) and the log(rank(size)) of cities, in particular with a slope close to 1 (Auerbach 1913; Henderson 1974; Gabaix 1999; Eeckhout 2004; Dittmar 2011; Gabaix 2016 ). My experiment is consistent with this statistical rank-size relationship of cities. Figure 4 shows that summing all individuals over all time periods for each location generates a Zipf distribution of populations. While Appendix section 5.6 provides a detailed statistical explanation, the intuition is that the sum total of location choices across many heterogeneous individuals creates a fat-tailed population distribution. compare the payoffs actually acheived to both the maximum equilibrium-payoff in the long-run (what I specify as 0 movement costs) and a random-walk counterfactual. The long run payoff is 36 in the 3 good economy, and 24 for the 2 good economy. The simulated random walk yeilds an average payoff of about 10 for either 2 or 3 good economies. 11 Figure 5 shows a time series of average individual payoffs, as well as both counterfactuals as thin dotted lines. 10 Cassady (1974) states "as time went on, regularly scheduled congregations of would be traders at some central point came into existence. There were obviously inherent advantages in the regular gathering of those wishing to trade, rather than relying haphazardly attempting to find one another in order to effect an exchange of goods".
11 The random walk was performed for each treatment. There were 100 simulation, each for 32 periods, where each individuals location in the next period is a multinoulli random variable with step-wise probability for locations that cost less than 6 endowment units and 0 probability elsewhere. Only when individuals are not land-tied do they get close to the long run maxima. However, payoffs are higher than the random-walk counterfactual in all cases, and in some cases significantly higher. These results accord to when and when not central marketplaces were formed. Sessions which formed central marketplaces did not reach maximim utility, but they did perform much better than sessions which did not. 12 Thus the evidence supports the following finding 
Extensive-Marginal Utility for CES Preferences
To formalize the extensive margins for CES preferences, drop transport-costs and note
Assume that adding the new good does not change the ratios of equilibrium consumption;
. Then
Then dividing by the right hand side implies ∆(n, ρ) > 0. Also see that the strength of the incentive depends on ρ; ρ → 1(perfect substitutes) ⇒ ∆(n, ρ) → 0. Note that the CES function amplifies the effect of ρ since all goods are substitutes or complements to the new good by an equal degree. Also note that adding transportation costs modify the incentives to agglomerate by altering endowment ratios in a generally uncertain way, and by reducing one's endowment which disincentivizes agglomeration. The session on the top left of that panel has an average (over periods 1 − 4) of about 2 individuals at the cell in the 1st-row 3rd-column, 2 individuals at the cell in the 2nd-row 2nd-column, and less than that at other locations. In the bi-panel for 'Period 8', that session is shown in the same relative position, now averaging about 3 individuals at the cell in the 1st-row 4th-column and 3 individuals in the 3rd-row 1st-column. Figure 6b shows the time-series of population maps after the locations were reset and the number of goods were changed. Note that these maps avoid the cell-size issues of satelite images, such as latitude/longitude projections which introduce a systematic bias by counting up people in heterogeneously sized cells. 
Data

Not Land-Tied Location Choices
To test the effect of being Land-Tied, I let an individuals' home relocate with their location choices. 
Agglomeration as a Dynamic Spatial Process
The diffusion coefficient differs from concentration indices by fully accounting for the spatial configuration, i.e. distinguishing bi-modal population-distributions that are close and far apart, and also differs from counts or densities which measure levels not changes over space and time. In words, the population in a cell this period is equals to the population there last period plus the net amount gained in the X-direction and Y-direction from last period. Specifically, I estimate the following first-order finitedifference approximation of the diffusion equation
+E (x, y,t) where N(x, y,t) is the population level at (x, y,t), N(x − ∆x, y,t) is the cell to the left, K is the coefficient of diffusion, and E is the error term. While differencing over time and space will eliminate some levelterms (such as time fixed effects), the errors could plausibly have spatiotemporal autocorrelation. So I estimate K by treating each session-block as a single large observation. This is important because one commonality in variables with linear rank-size relationships is that they are non-negative or 0-truncated variables (i.e. sizes, shares, or counts (Simon 1955; Adamic 2011; Geerolf 2017) ) with a lot of probability mass in the right tail. Figure 4 shows the population aggregates follow a zipf distribution. Assume individual i choose location k with probability σ k i ; then i ∼ Multinoulli(σ i ) Assume that all individuals have the same location ordering, with individual heterogeneity only in the probability magnitudes (i.e. as suggested in Figure 9 ). This means σ i = σ is randomly distributed, and the locationsum of I people is a multinomial mixture distribution;
Zipf Derivation
Note the expected population sums ares = E[s|σ , I] = Iσ , with the expected population size of a particular location s k ∈ s corresponding to the probability σ k ∈ σ . Now assume that the distribution of expected sums conditioned on σ are approximately exponential; F(s k |λ ) = 1 − exp(−λ s k ). Also assume that individual heterogeneity approximately takes the form λ ∼ exp (θ ). Then substituting these exponential mixture weights into the survivor function,
For details on how the survivor function determines the rank-size relationship, see Appendix Section 5.5.
But this result means s k ∼ Loglog(θ , 1), which is a fat-tailed distribution. In particular, since the lim (1+ s k /θ ) −1 − (s k ) −1 = 0 as s k → ∞, the expected population size distribution converges to a Pareto (1) distribution. In line with empirical evidence, this limiting approximation also predicts population-counts are more likely to appear zipf when examining datasets with truncated populations.
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Introduction
This is an experiment on economic decision-making. If you read the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment. Experimental decisions will involve Experimental Currency Units (ECU ) and will be converted to dollars at a rate of 4ECU = $1 at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant. You must also put away all materials unrelated to the experiment, including cell-phones, tablets, and pen-and-paper. If you do not follow these instructions you will be excluded from the experiment and paid only the show-up payment of $7.
Before beginning the experiment, we will read through these instructions. Alongside the reading, we will do a tutorial showing you how the interface works. When these instructions say On my command, then wait for me to tell you what to do.
If you have any questions during the tutorial, quietly raise your hand, and I will call on you. If you have any questions during the experiment, quietly raise your hand, and I will answer them privately.
On my command, click "Initialize".
GamePlay Tutorial
You have been given 12 units of either , , or and are located at on the map. You should see your default endowment on the top left of the screen.
Your task is to decide where to locate. There are benefits from trade if people with different goods meet at the same location, but there are costs of moving locations. Note that every person will make these decisions simultaneously, so noone will know what any other person's decisions will be when making their own. Also note that not all goods will be available during some periods.
Location Choice
In each period of the experiment, you will click on a location on the map to move to. Every location has an x and y coordinate. You should see your default location somewhere on the Location Choice Map. Every cell that you move away from will cost you units of your endowment.
On my command, click somewhere else on the map one time. Your total transportation costs to get there are shown below the X .
On my command, click your home location. Your total transportation costs to get there are shown below the X . It costs you nothing to stay at home.
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Endowment Choice
In each period of the experiment, each of you will also choose which good to be endowed with. On my command, Click another good. On my command, Click your original good.
If you do not choose a different endowment, your endowment will be the same as last period.
Earnings
There are benefits to locating with others who can trade with you.
• If you and another player both choose the same location, and each player has the same good, then there won't be a trade and each will earn their endowment.
• If you and another player both choose the same location, and each player has a different good, then a trade will occur and your earnings will be higher than your endowment.
There can be more than two players at the same location. In general, your earnings increase when others bring more of a different good but not if they bring the same good as you.
On my command, click the "Earnings" tab.
You can see exactly what your earnings could be under different combinations by moving the sliders around. These sliders represent the quantity of different goods that you and other traders bring to a location.
On my command, put 9 units supplied of My Good, by Me.
• If you are endowed with , then this means you brought 9 .
On my command, put 0 units supplied of My Good, by Others
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought 0 .
On my command, put 11 units supplied of Different Good #1, by Others
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought either 11 or 11 .
• If you are endowed with , then this means others brought either 11 or 11 . 2
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On my command, put 0 units supplied of Different Good #2, by Others You can see your Earnings would be 19.
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 19 when noone else brings and other people bring either 11 or 11
On my command, Now put 10 units supplied of Different Good #2, by Others You can see your Earnings would be 28.
• If you bring 9 , then you earn 28 when noone else brings and other people bring either (11 and 10 ) or (10 and 11 )
On my command, increase the quantity supplied of My Good, By Others. See that this decreases your payoffs. Note that since there are only 5 other players, each with 12 units, the sum-total of all goods provided by others must be less than 60. If you try to simulate more than that, you will get an error message.
Everyone take two minutes to play around with the sliders and understand your payoffs. Are there any questions about how the simulator works?
Beside these sliders are a table. This table shows your previous location choices, the good you supplied, your earnings, and the period.
History
On my command, click the "History" tab.
There are 3 maps, each pertaining to a particular good, show a summary of everyones choices last period. Focus on the map of .
Each location on this history map corresponds to a location on the location choice map. At each location, "Quant" shows the total quantity of brought by all players to that cell in the last period. Since this is the first period, there is no history, and all quantities are 0. That will change as the game progresses; cells with more in the last period will be colored darker blue.
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Also shown at each location are the average earnings of players who had . So if one player brought 9 (3 units lost) and earned 38, and another brought 12 (0 units lost) and earned 50, then "Earn" would show (50 + 38)/2 = 44.
The maps for and are read the same way. Are there any questions about how to read the maps?
Period Timing
Each period is timed, and lasts a total of 60 seconds. The amount of time left in the period is shown in the top right of the screen, and will update every 10 seconds.
You will have 55 seconds to make your choices. When the timer is up, you are moved to your chosen location. The computer will then exchange goods amongst all of the players at that location, and will calculate your earnings based on how much of each good everyone brought. These calculations are the same that are shown by the simulator. You will then see a pop-up for 5 seconds that summarizes your choices and your earnings. Your home will be moved the location you chose last period, you will get another 12 units, and the next period will begin.
Note that you can lock in your choices at any point before the timer is up by clicking the 'submit' button. If you don't click submit, then your location choice will be the last location clicked before the timer is up. If you do not click any locations, you will stay at your home location. Are there any questions about how the game will progress?
Game Conclusion and Payment
At the end of this experiment, a short post-game survey and a summary of your experiment payout will come up. Your in-game payment was calculated by randomly choosing your earnings from one period before a pause and one period after a pause and converting them from ECU to $. Your in-game payment is then added to your showup payment of $7. Once you have submitted the survey, please remove your hands from the mice/keyboard and wait quietly. You will then soon be called up individually to receive your payment.
Practice Round
There will now be a live practice period where you can explore the interface on your own. Note that neither this period nor the tutorial can be chosen for payment. When this practice period is finished, please wait for further instruction.
On my command, make a location choice and click "Submit" to end the turial period and begin the practice round. 
